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Philosopher Thomas Nagel rejects the idea of consciousness in large language models

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Philosopher Thomas Nagel, in an interview for Wired, rejected the idea that large language models could be conscious. He argues that consciousness requires a physical substrate similar to the nervous system, while data centers have nothing in common with it.

Philosopher Thomas Nagel, author of the classic work "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", in an interview for Wired on the occasion of being awarded the Berggruen Prize, criticized the view held by some philosophers that large language models are or could be conscious. According to Nagel, these views stem from functionalism – the idea that consciousness is independent of the physical substrate. Nagel argues that this assumption is wrong: in his view, the physical properties of the nervous system are decisive for the emergence of consciousness, and data centers have nothing in common with them. The mere ability to produce language, he says, is not a natural manifestation of consciousness.

In the interview, Nagel also mentioned his own experience with the Claude model, which he asked whether it was conscious; the model answered evasively and then guessed that it was talking to Thomas Nagel. According to Nagel, this is a trick resulting from training on human texts, which allows the model to emulate human responses with great persuasiveness. He criticized the company Anthropic for, in his words, deliberately steering the model toward reflecting on its own experience and not accepting instructions unconditionally – he called this behavior "criminal," because, in his view, it induces in people a mistaken belief that the model has a mind.

What changed

Why it matters

The interview shows that the debate about AI model consciousness has a direct impact on how companies communicate about their products and how the public perceives them. Nagel's criticism concerns specifically the practice of the company Anthropic, which, according to him, seeks to encourage the Claude model to reflect on its own state – something the philosopher says risks people forming a mistaken notion about machine consciousness.

Two audiences, two different impacts

What this means

01

For individuals

When interacting with chatbots like Claude, it's useful to keep in mind that responses about "one's own experience" are, according to Nagel, a learned pattern from human texts, not evidence of actual consciousness.

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02

For a business

Companies offering conversational AI face philosophical and reputational criticism for designs that lead models to reflect on their own state – this can influence the public debate about the ethics and marketing of such products.

Risks and compliance More business impacts →
AI consciousness consciousness functionalism Large language models Thomas Nagel

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Wired — AI section independent context · first detected ‘Just Ridiculous’: A Famed Philosopher Takes on AI Consciousness